PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GROUP INC - FORM 8-K - EX-99 - DISCUSSION MATERIALS FOR THE MARCH 28, 2011 PRESENTATION

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United States and PSEG Power Nuclear Preparedness

March 22, 2011

Exhibit 99

Forward Looking Statement

Readers are cautioned that statements contained in this presentation about our and our subsidiaries' future performance, including future revenues, earnings,

strategies, prospects, consequences and all other statements that are not purely historical, are forward-looking statements for purposes of the safe harbor provisions

under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. When used herein, the words “anticipate”, “intend”, “estimate”, “believe”, “expect”, “plan”, “should”,

“hypothetical”, “potential”, “forecast”, “project”, variations of such words and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Although we

believe that our expectations are based on reasonable assumptions, they are subject to risks and uncertainties and we can give no assurance they will be achieved.

The results or developments projected or predicted in these statements may differ materially from what may actually occur. Factors which could cause results or

events to differ from current expectations include, but are not limited to:

Adverse changes in energy industry law, policies and regulation, including market structures, and a potential shift away from competitive markets towards subsidized

market mechanisms,

transmission planning and cost allocation rules, including rules regarding how transmission is planned and who is permitted to build transmission going forward, and

reliability standards.

Any inability of our transmission and distribution businesses to obtain adequate and timely rate relief and regulatory approvals from federal and state regulators.

Changes in federal and state environmental regulations that could increase our costs or limit operations of our generating units.

Changes in nuclear regulation and/or developments in the nuclear power industry generally that could limit operations of our nuclear generating units.

Actions or activities at one of our nuclear units located on a multi-unit site that might adversely affect our ability to continue to operate that unit or other

units located at the same site.

Any inability to balance our energy obligations, available supply and trading risks.

Any deterioration in our credit quality.

Availability of capital and credit at commercially reasonable terms and conditions and our ability to meet cash needs.

Any inability to realize anticipated tax benefits or retain tax credits.

Changes in the cost of, or interruption in the supply of, fuel and other commodities necessary to the operation of our generating units.

Delays in receipt of necessary permits and approvals for our construction and development activities.

Delays or unforeseen cost escalations in our construction and development activities.

Adverse changes in the demand for or price of the capacity and energy that we sell into wholesale electricity markets.

Increase in competition in energy markets in which we compete.

Adverse performance of our decommissioning and defined benefit plan trust fund investments and changes in discount rates and funding requirements.

Changes in technology and customer usage patterns.

For further information, please refer to our Annual Report on Form 10-K, including Item 1A. Risk Factors, and subsequent reports on Form 10-Q and Form 8-K filed

with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These documents address in further detail our business, industry issues and other factors that could cause actual

results to differ materially from those indicated in this presentation. In addition, any forward-looking statements included herein represent our estimates only as of

today and should not be relied upon as representing our estimates as of any subsequent date. While we may elect to update forward-looking statements from time to

time, we specifically disclaim any obligation to do so, even if our internal estimates change, unless otherwise required by applicable securities laws.

DISCLAIMER:

“While PSEG Nuclear has made every attempt to assure that the

information

included

herein,

including

the

information

about

the

situation in

Japan, is up to date, the event is dynamic and only Tokyo Electric or its

authorized representatives can confirm the accuracy or currency of the

information presented with respect to its nuclear facilities. Information

herein concerning facilities other than PSEG Nuclear facilities has been

obtained from sources PSEG Nuclear deems reliable.”

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station

Six BWR units at the Fukushima Nuclear Station

Units 1, 2, 3 in operation prior to event

Units 4, 5, 6 in outage prior to event

Unit 1

Fuel

Cladding

Boiling Water Reactor –

Three Barriers to Radiation Release

Boiling Water Reactor –

Three Barriers to Radiation Release

Japanese Plant Response following Earth Quake

Steam vented

to Torus

Water returned to

Pressure Vessel

Cooling capability

lost due to high

Torus water temps

Fuel uncovered as

steam vented to Torus

Hydrogen produced

from fuel damage

Pressure builds up

in containment

Hydrogen builds up

in containment

Japanese Emergency Escalates following Tsunami

Attempts to Vent Containment Result in Hydrogen Explosions

Operators attempt

to vent containment

Hydrogen buildup

explodes in Unit 1,

3 Reactor Building

Hydrogen buildup

explodes in Unit 2

Torus

United States Plant Designs

United States Plant Designs

Site –

specific designed criteria developed for each site

Based on historical information with added conservatism

(flood, hurricane, earthquake, etc)

Based on geography

Plant designed to withstand severe events and maintain

design basis

Plant modifications / upgrades implemented based on

industry experience and strengthened regulation

23 Boiling Water Reactors in

the United States utilize the

Mark I Containment

United States Design Improvements

United States Design Improvements

Significant Control Room Modifications after TMI –

1980

United States Design Improvements

Control Room TMI –

1980

Strengthened Torus following NRC Regulation –

1980-83

United States Design Improvements

Strengthened Torus –

1980

Control Room TMI –

1980

Physical Separation of safety systems following Browns Ferry Fire –

1979

United States Design Improvements

Fire Protection –

1979

Strengthened Torus –

1980

Control Room TMI –

1980

Hardened Containment Vent to prevent H2 Buildup –

1992

United States Design Improvements

Containment Vent -

1992

Fire Protection –

1979

Strengthened Torus –

1980

Control Room TMI –

1980

Enhanced Battery Capability for Station Black Out –

1988

United States Design Improvements

Station Black Out –

1988

Containment Vent –

1992

Fire Protection –

1979

Strengthened Torus –

1980

Control Room TMI –

1980

Redundant Generator and Pumps following 9/11 –

2002

Spare Diesel / Pump –

2002

Station Black Out –

1988

Containment Vent –

1992

Fire Protection –

1979

Strengthened Torus –

1980

Control Room TMI –

1980

United States Design Improvements

Used Fuel Pool Protection

Used Fuel Pools designed to

station Design Bases criteria

Redundant pumps available to

ensure used fuel pool cooling

Alternative fuel pool cooling

capability added post 9/11

Multiple sources of water and

power for cooling beyond

design bases

Emergency Planning

Radiation Levels are fluctuating at Fukushima Daiichi

Site Boundary

50 mrem/hr –

spikes up to 1200 mrem/hr

Between Reactor Buildings

10,000 mrem/hr –

40,000 mrem/hr

(Likely spikes following Unit 2 explosion)

Controlled venting of containment and issues with used fuel pools

resulted in radiation releases

General evacuation within 12 miles / US citizens within 50 miles

Potassium Iodide tablets distributed to area residents and workers

Background

General population receives ~600 mrem/year

United States Nuclear worker limited to 5,000 mrem/yr

PSEG Nuclear limits exposure to 2,000 mrem/yr

United States Emergency Planning

1978 –

10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) deemed appropriate

Limited offsite agency participation –

Site driven

1980 –

Post TMI –

NRC NUREG 0654 implemented

Determined appropriate emergency response program

•

number required on shift / emergency facilities / offsite participation required

Evaluated every 2 years by FEMA / NRC

Integrated response between onsite and offsite agencies and states

Mandated siren for alerting public and Emergency News Center

Established 50 Mile ingestion pathway (Tested every 6 years)

2001 –

Potassium Iodide recommended for protection of thyroid

Distribution to residents within 10 miles of nuclear plant enacted

2002 –

Post 9/11 Security Changes implemented

Required greater integration of security plan and emergency plan

2006 –

Battery Backup on sirens recommended

Salem / Hope Creek Site Specific Information

Salem –

Hope Creek Seismic Design

Salem –

Hope Creek Seismic Design

Design Basis levels for environmental events are

determined independently for every plant in the US

Based on geographic and historic information

Salem –

Hope Creek Seismic Design –

6.5 Richter Scale

All structures, systems, and components important to plant

safety will perform safety function to keep plant cool

Re-evaluated during current License Renewal review

The largest earthquake in New Jersey occurred in 1783

Magnitude 5.3

Felt from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania

Salem/Hope Creek Flooding Design

Designed for flood level 22.9 ft above ground level

Water-tight doors

Exterior walls reinforced concrete

Max. flood predicted for Tsunami –

5.6 ft above ground level

Coincident with High Tide and High Winds

Max. flood predicted for Hurricane –

22.9 ft above ground level

Category 4

Coincident with High Tide and High Winds

Normal level for Delaware River –

11 ft below ground level

Mean Water level of river –

89ft

Record height –

2.5 feet below ground level (1950)

Salem/Hope Creek Flood Design

Salem 1 & 2

Hope Creek

22.9 ft above ground level

Site Flooding Actions

Worst Case flooding event for site is Hurricane Surge

Expect forecast >24hrs from event

Site actions planned at specific river levels, including

Emergency Plan staffing if required

93.0 ft Local Area Road Flooding may restrict access to

site and to EOF/ENC

95.0 ft. Salem and Hope Creek doors to be shut

98.5 ft Hot Standby in 6 hours

99.5 ft Hope Creek, Salem in Hot Shutdown in 12 and cold

shutdown within following 24 hrs. Unusual Event Declared

124 ft Emergency Diesel Generators are impacted

Hope Creek EDG Flood Protection Design

Hope Creek 4 Dedicated Emergency Diesel Generators

protected from flooding up to 31 feet above site grade

Hope Creek Diesel Combustion Air

Intakes 31 feet above site grade

Hope Creek EDG

Combustion Air Intakes

Salem Diesel Flood Protection Design

Salem Diesels protected from flooding up to 25 feet above

site grade. Starting Air, Fuel and control systems in flood

protection area.

Salem Diesel Combustion

Air intake 25 feet above

site grade

Industry Mark 1 Containment Modifications

US Industry response to Severe

Accident Management Program

(SAMP 1988 ) required

implementation of hardened

external torus vent to prevent

hydrogen infiltration into

reactor building during

venting.

Alternate Makeup Fire Pump

Post 9/11 regulatory

requirements included

development of alternate fire

protection, fuel pool and reactor

vessel makeup strategies.

Photo of dedicated site portable

diesel fire pump utilized in post

accident event.

Operated by PSEG Nuclear

PSEG Ownership: 100%

Technology: Boiling Water Reactor

Total Capacity: 1,197MW

Owned Capacity: 1,197MW

License Expiration: 2026

Filed for license extension,

August 2009

Next Refueling 2012

Operated by PSEG Nuclear

Ownership: PSEG –

57%

Exelon –

43%

Technology: Pressurized Water Reactor

Total Capacity: 2,337MW

Owned Capacity: 1,342MW

License Expiration: 2016 and 2020

Filed for license extension,

August 2009

Next Refueling

Unit 1 –

Fall 2011

Unit 2 –

Spring 2011

Operated by Exelon

PSEG Ownership: 50%

Technology: Boiling Water Reactor

Total Capacity: 2,245MW

Owned Capacity: 1,122MW

License Expiration: 2033 and 2034

Next Refueling

Unit 2 –

2012

Unit 3 –

Fall 2011

Hope Creek

Salem Units 1 and 2

Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3

Our five unit nuclear fleet

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